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Routine Body Scanning in Airports:
A Fourth Amendment Analysis
Focused on Health Effects
by REBEKKA MURPHY*
Introduction
On January 25, 2011, the Transportation and Security Administration
("TSA") announced its intention to use Advanced Imaging Technology
("AIT") to screen all passengers in airports.' The announcement remains
controversial because, while AIT has the advantage of detecting on-body
explosives and thus augments flight safety, its use also raises health
concerns. Conclusive research on the technology's long-term health effects
is wanting. Moreover, since the TSA administers the scans routinely and
without regard to any individualized suspicion, the practice raises Fourth
Amendment concerns related to freedom from unreasonable searches.
This Note argues that while jurisprudence on medically intrusive
searches fails to provide either clear support for or opposition to routine
body scanning, the special needs doctrine requires TSA officials to have
reasonable suspicion before scanning passengers, at least as long as AIT's
impact on health remains uncertain. The Supreme Court has used a three-
factor test to evaluate warrant requirements for searches that implicate
medical concerns. The test yields inconclusive results in the case of AIT
* J.D. Candidate 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.
Philosophy, University of California, San Diego. I would like to thank Professor George Bisharat
for his insight, guidance, and extraordinary patience in reviewing multiple drafts. Many thanks to
the Quarterly 's volume 39 editorial staff for their hard work, and to Jeffrey Ogorek for his
unwavering support.
1. While AIT is a primary screening method, passengers may opt out by submitting to a
pat-down search instead. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT
UPDATE FOR TSA ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY 2 (Jan. 25, 2011) [hereinafter TSA
ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY], available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-pia-tsa-ait.pdf However, since
pat-downs usually require reasonable suspicion, the proffered alternative does not impact this
Note's analysis. See Thirty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 38 Geo. L.J. Ann.
Rev. Crim. Proc. 3, 60-62 (2009) (explaining the reasonable suspicion requirement for pat-down
frisks).
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however, due to the technology's undetermined effects on health. In the
case of special needs jurisprudence, however, the uncertain health risks
ultimately provide a basis for requiring reasonable suspicion. Until the
TSA can establish via independent scientific research that AIT does not
pose a long-term risk to health, the TSA's practice of suspicionless body
scans is-and will continue to be-in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Part I of this Note gives pertinent information on the state of airport
security today. It describes body scanning technology and the health
concerns related to its use, and lays out relevant portions of the Fourth
Amendment. Part II examines Supreme Court cases on searches that fell
under the special needs doctrine, and examines the elements required for a
search to qualify for the exception. Part III discusses case law on
medically intrusive searches. Finally, Part IV explores the application of
medical intrusion and special needs jurisprudence to the use of AIT in
airports, and explains how the latter provides a basis for imposing a
reasonable suspicion requirement on TSA's present use of body scans.
I. Background
A. The State of Airport Security Today
In order to gain an accurate view of the condition of airport security
today, it is worthwhile to assess the government's interests in securing
these transportation centers, describe the technology in controversy, and
give an account of the health concerns raised to date.
1. Government Interests at Airports: Expedient Detection and Deterrence of
Threats
The events of 9/11 changed the face of airport security. Prior to the
attack, neither Congress nor the American people were particularly
concerned about the possibility of suicide hijackings.2 Congress had
previously vested responsibility for flight security in the Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA"), an agency that perceived sabotage and explosives
as the most significant dangers to aviation.3  This pre-9/1 1 era security
focused on obtaining intelligence that identified specific threats, passenger
prescreening, checkpoint screening, and onboard security. 4  Passenger
2. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT, at 82-83 (2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf
(stating that the 1997 final report of the Gore Commission did not discuss suicide hijackings, and
more than a decade had lapsed since the last domestic hijacking).
3. Id at 82.
4. Id. at 83.
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prescreening amounted to little more than no-fly lists and profiles to detect
"'direct' threats,"5 while search technology consisted of simple walk-
6through metal detectors and cargo X-rays. Such checkpoint screening
methods often suffered from detecting either too much or too little, often
giving false positives while overlooking real threats.7 In sum, the FAA's
provisions required a specific threat in order to subject travelers to added
scrutiny, focused on passenger rights, and "[did] not focus on terrorism."8
As the events of 9/11 made clear, the airline industry faced the threat
of suicide bombers, and its security measures to date were inadequate. On
that day, hijackers coordinated an attack that took control of four different
aircrafts at three airports.9 All members of the attack boarded successfully.
While airport security subjected some to passenger prescreening, the only
consequence was that the airline held their bags off-plane until the screened
passenger boarded. Once boarded, they were able to hijack each plane,
likely using mace to control some passengers, and stabbing others.10 The
hijackers turned each plane into "guided missiles, loaded with up to 11,400
gallons of jet fuel."" In the span of two hours, two planes crashed into the
World Trade Center, one crashed into the Pentagon, and one plowed into a
field in Pennsylvania after passengers defeated the attempted hijacking.
The attack killed nearly 3,000 people, 12 completely destroyed or damaged
buildings in the World Trade Center complex, collapsed part of the
Pentagon, and imperiled the lives of tens of thousands.' 3
5. Id.
6. See id. at 2 (explaining passengers would be "screened by a walk-through metal
detector," while "an [x]-ray machine ... screened .. .carry-on[s]").
7. See id. at 84 (indicating "[m]any deadly and dangerous items did not set off metal
detectors," while X-rays did little to "distinguish .. . [deadly items] from innocent everyday
items"). Also telling is the FAA's decision to permit knives less than four inches long, for fear
that a ban would cause too many false positives and exacerbate congestion at security
checkpoints. Id
8. Id. at 86. See also Id. at 85-86 (stating that "without 'specific and credible' evidence of
a plot .. . the FAA's leadership focused elsewhere," and that "Congress concentrated its efforts
on a 'passenger bill of rights' to improve capacity, efficiency, and customer satisfaction in the
aviation system").
9. See id at 1-14 (giving an account of the hijacking of American Flight 11 and United
Flight 175 in Boston, the hijacking of American Flight 77 at Washington Dulles, and the
hijacking of United Flight 93 in Newark).
10. See id at 1-4 (giving an account of the hijackers pass through airport security and the
events of each particular plane while in flight).
11. Id at 4.
12. See id. at 552 n. 188 (stating that the attacks killed 2,749 non-terrorists).
13. See id at 311, 314 (explaining the damage to the Pentagon and the number of lives
imperiled).
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As a result, the government-now more than ever-has a significant
interest in detecting and deterring terrorist threats in the context of air
travel. The conditions at airports, however, pose a few challenges to this
goal. First, the large volume of people at airports inherently creates a large
volume of potential security threats. Second, because airport patrons must
meet scheduled departures, officials have only a brief opportunity in which
to assess whether each person presents a risk. Accordingly, a quick, non-
discretionary way of screening every person is ideal; it enables the
government to detect threats in a way that is sensitive to the volume of
people and time pressures at airports. Significantly, such a method also
acts as a deterrent, since TSA officials would screen everyone.
In addition to an expedient and non-discretionary method of
screening, recent events underscore the government's interest in detecting
non-metallic threats, which can be concealed underneath clothing. 14 In
December 2009 for example, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to
detonate plastic explosives hidden in his underwear while aboard
Northwest Airlines flight 253. On another occasion, airport security
found plastic explosives hidden in a passenger's shoes.16 These encounters
and others like them have given rise to a demand for screening measures
that identify such dangers.
2. Congress Reacts: New Agency, New Legislation
In order to deal with the emerging threats to national security heralded
by the 9/11 attacks, Congress created the TSA "to strengthen the security of
the nation's transportation systems." 7 Congress also passed the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act (the "Act") in November 2001, which set
forth the major mandates for the agency.' 8 Relevant portions of the Act
appoint the TSA responsible for security in all modes of transportation and
for the screening operations of passenger air transportation.19 Significantly,
14. See Brian Bennett, Pat-Downs Aimed at Finding Explosive; Easy to Carry and Hard to
Detect, PETN is an Al Qaeda Favorite, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 24, 2010 at Al (indicating that the
plastic explosive powder PETN, is easy to hide or transform; the only way to detect it is via body
scans or X-ray cargo scans and that, even then, the effectiveness of detection devices hinge on the
machine operator's expertise because the devices only detect anomalies).
15. See id. (stating that authorities believe Umar boarded Northwest Flight 253 with the
plastic explosive powder PETN sewn into his clothing).
16. Id.
17. Our History, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/research/tribute
/history.shtm (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
18. Id
19. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597, 597-98
(2001). The Act also vests TSA with additional duties and powers, including developing
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the Act required "as soon as practicable . .. screening or inspection of all
individuals, goods, [and] property .. . before entry into a secured area of an
airport"20 and appropriated funds for accelerated research in on-person
threat detection technology. 2 1 The Act thus signaled a shift in Congress'
priorities: one from passenger satisfaction and efficiency, to piracy threat
detection.
3. The Rise ofAdvanced Imaging Technology
Consistent with the mandates of the Act, in 2009, the TSA conducted
pilot operations in nineteen airports to evaluate the use of AIT, including
backscatter X-ray and millimeter wave devices.22 A mere six of these
airports used the technology as a "primary screening method," and only in
a limited role;2 3 that is to say, only six airports used AIT as a routine search
procedure, whereby the TSA performed screenings on each passenger
regardless of the level of suspicion aroused.24
Despite the small fraction of airports that used AIT routinely in 2009's
pilot operations, on January 25, 2011, the agency propelled AIT into a
primary screening procedure,2 6 thereby subjecting all passengers to AIT
searches.27 In exploring imaging technology, the TSA had hoped to find a
way to "quickly, and without physical contact, screen passengers during
primary or secondary inspection for prohibited items including weapons,
strategies for dealing with threats to transportation security, enforcing security-related
requirements, and overseeing security measures at airports. Id. at 598.
20. Id. at 608.
21. Id. at 637-38.
22. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR TSA
WHOLE BODY IMAGING 2 (July 23, 2009) [hereinafter TSA Whole Body Imaging], available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy pia-tsa-wbiupdate.pdf (At the time, TSA
referred to AIT as "Whole Body Imaging Technology." They later changed the name to AIT,
which remains the current terminology.); Safer Air Act of 2010, S. 3536, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010)
(as introduced June 24, 2010; referred to Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation).
23. S. 3536 (as introduced June 24, 2010; referred to Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation).
24. See Tobias W. Mock, Note, The TSA's New X-ray Vision: The Fourth Amendment
Implications of "Body-Scan" Searches at Domestic Airport Security Checkpoints, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 213, 217 (2009) (defining "primary screening").
25. Despite the limited number of airports using AIT in the pilot study, by December 23,
2010, TSA used AIT in 75 airports; the attack on Northwest Flight 253 hastened the
technology's deployment. See Faye Flam, Debating the Merits of X-ray vs. Millimeter-wave
Airport Scanner, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 23, 2010, at Al (explaining the effect of the Northwest
flight 253 attack, and enumerating AIT's prevalence as of December 2010).
26. TSA ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 2 (stating "AIT... has
moved ... into normal screening operations"); see generally Mock, supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
27. See TSA ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1.
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explosives, and other metallic and non-metallic threat objects hidden under
layers of clothing."28 To this end, body scanners have a sizable advantage
over their predecessor, the metal detector, because they can detect "on-
body plastic explosives and other nonmetallic explosives."2 9
AIT works by creating a full-body image of the passenger, while
highlighting the particular regions where it detects foreign objects on a
person.30 Such technology can better alert officials to the kind of
anomalies on the body that might signal a passenger carrying an explosive.
The two types of AIT currently in use are the backscatter and millimeter
wave devices.31 The former relies on high-speed X-rays to scan the surface
of the body, 32 detecting foreign objects where the rays deflect differently. 33
In the process, the backscatter delivers a dose of ionizing radiation, which
the TSA says is "less than the radiation received in two minutes of airplane
flight at altitude."34 The backscatter is powerful enough to reveal matter
underneath the skin, including medical implants,3 5 and can produce images
sharp enough to capture the shape of a person's navel, along with shapes of
other, more private body areas.36 In fact, the technology is so exact that the
American Civil Liberties Union once likened the backscatter to a "virtual
strip search."37 Since then, the TSA has integrated software to distort the
images that the machines produce, blurring both the face and the intimate
28. TSA WHOLE BODY IMAGING, supra note 22, at 3; see also, Susan Stellin, Are Scanners
Worth the Risk?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2010, at TR3 (explaining that "[u]nlike metal detectors,
these machines can detect objects made with other materials, like plastic and ceramic.
[However,] they can't see anything hidden inside your body, or detect certain explosives.").
29. Safer Air Act of 2010, S. 3536, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010) (as introduced June 24, 2010;
referred to Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation).
30. TSA ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 2.
31. Id. at 3.
32. TSA WHOLE BODY IMAGING, supra note 22, at 3.
33. Id (stating "X-ray beam[s] scanned over the body[] . . . are reflected back from the body
and .. . objects placed ... on the body"; see also Flam, supra note 25 (giving one X-ray scanner
engineer's description of how the backscatter works: "[T]he image comes from X-rays that
bounce off the body. Different materials will scatter X-rays to different extents ... so the images
will reveal objects inside a person's clothing.").
34. TSA ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 3.
35. Id
36. Mock, supra note 24, at 229.
37. Id.; see also Gary Stoller, Backlash Grows vs. Full-body Scanners; Fliers Worry About
Privacy, Health Risks, USA TODAY, July 13, 2010, at 1A (describing AIT as "types of machines
that can see underneath clothing").
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details of the body.38 Now, the TSA describes the resulting blurred image
39
as comparable to a mere "chalk etching" of a person.
The millimeter wave technology, on the other hand, "uses non-
ionizing radio frequency energy in the millimeter wave spectrum to
generate an image based on the energy reflected from the body." The TSA
claims the energy projected onto the body during a scan is one hundred
thousand times less than a cell phone transmission.4 0 In the millimeter
wave machine, "two antennas rotate around passengers and transmit the
waves, which have a frequency [somewhere] between microwaves and
infrared."4 1  The waves go through clothing but not water, the main
component of the human body, which stops the waves and reflects them
back.42 Since the relative degree of reflection or transmission depends on
the material these waves strike, the machines should register items hidden
under clothing as either darker or lighter regions; in turn, such disparate
shading can indicate where on a passenger's body an official should
search.43
4. Despite FDA Comment, Health Concerns Remain
While the emergent technology shows promise in meeting the
government's interest in nondiscretionary screening at airports, it also
raises health concerns. In April 2010, four members of the faculty of the
University of California, San Francisco addressed a letter of concern to the
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.44 The faculty
expressed worry that the safety of the backscatter had yet to be "adequately
demonstrated," and that the dosage, while safe if distributed to the entire
body, was delivered only to the skin and thus may be too high.4 5  The
38. Mock, supra note 24, at 230.
39. See id., at 230 (reporting TSA to describe the new images as akin to a "chalk outline of a
person"); see also How it Works: Advanced Imaging Technology, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/how-itworks.shtm (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
40. TSA WHOLE BODY IMAGING, supra note 22, at 3.
41. Flam, supra note 25.
42. Id.
43. Id.; see also Stellin, supra note 28 (explaining that "[t]he 'millimeter wave'
machines ... do not use X-rays, [but rather] bounce electromagnetic waves off the body to
produce a[n] image [similar to those produced by backscatters]").
44. Letter from Univ. Cal., S.F. Faculty to Dr. John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President
for Sci. and Tech. (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.npr.org/assets/news/2010/05/17/
concem.pdf.
45. Id; see also Marnie Hunter, Airport Body-Scan Radiation Under Scrutiny, CNN (Nov.
12, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-12/travel/body.scanning.radiation-I
backscatter-radiological-research-radiation?.s=PM:TRAVEL (stating that David Brenner,
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professors voiced reservations about the backscatter's use on the elderly,
children, patients with HIV or cancer, and women susceptible to breast
cancer.4 6 Finally, they cautioned that the "negative effects may on balance
far outweigh the potential benefit of increased [threat] detection," and
pressed for an independent evaluation.47
The Deputy Director for Technical and Radiological Initiatives of the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") and the Chief Administrative
Officer for the TSA wrote a response letter in October 2010.48 In it, they
claimed the FDA had regulated manufacturers to ensure radiation safety of
full-body X-ray security screening systems since 1990.49 The writers
indicated that between 1998 and 2003, the FDA consulted its independent
expert advisory committee, who raised issues regarding national radiation
safety.50 To address these issues, the FDA assembled "a working group of
experts that included representatives from manufacturers, security agencies,
and other regulatory agencies," who developed a national standard by
which to evaluate radiation safety. 1 Specifically, the standard required
facilities to ensure that no one received an effective dose in excess of
twenty-five microREM in any twelve-month period.52 The letter went on
to state that backscatters deliver less than one-thousandth of that dose per
screening. 53 Additionally, the FDA created a web page with information
on the safety of radiation-emitting security devices. The site provides that
the level of ionizing radiation produced in a single backscatter screening is
less than the amount of naturally occurring radiation that a person receives
in forty-two minutes of ordinary living. 54 Thus, in order to exceed the
Professor of Radiation Biophysics at Columbia University, believes skin cancer to be the likely
concern).
46. Letter from Univ. Cal., S.F. Faculty to Dr. John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President
for Sci. and Tech., supra note 44.
47. Id
48. Letter from John L. McCrohan, Deputy Dir. for Technical and Radiological Initiatives,
Food and Drug Admin., and Karen R. Shelton Waters, Deputy Assistant Adm'r/Chief Admin.
Officer, Transp. Sec. Admin., to Dr. John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President for Sci. and
Tech., Executive Office of the President, in Response to University of California San Francisco
Regarding Their Letter of Concern (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/Radiation-
EmittingProducts/RadiationEmittingProductsandProcedures/ SecuritySystems/ucm231857.htm






54. Radiation-Emitting Products: Products for Security Screening ofPeople, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Radiation-EmittingProducts/RadiationEmitting Productsand
Procedures/SecuritySystems/ucm227201.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
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safety standard dose limit, an individual would have to be screened more
55than one thousand times in one year.
Despite the FDA's reply letter and website, scientists, Congress
members, newspapers, and internet sources continue to express concern
about the backscatter's impact on passenger well-being. The major health
worries largely fall into one of four categories: the possible increased risk
of cancer, the TSA's failure to ensure safety generally, the lack of
independent oversight and testing, and questions regarding the device's
functionality.
With respect to the cancer concern, the backscatter differs from
medical imaging equipment similarly reliant on X-rays. Namely, the
backscatter concentrates radiation dosage to the skin's surface and
superficial tissue, while medical X-rays disperse radiation throughout the
whole body.56 Given the backscatter's novel distribution of radiation, "the
long-term risks ... of exposure [are] unknown and. . . the dose to the skin
may be high enough to cause concern about increased risks of melanoma
and breast cancer."67 Also, some scientists are particularly worried about
the risk of basal cell carcinoma, a type of cancer that often develops on the
top of the head. 8 According to the director of Columbia's Center for
Radiological Research, the backscatter delivers to the scalp twenty times
the dose that the TSA and the airline industry typically quote as average.59
Such excessive X-ray exposure is problematic because it can act as a
cancer rate multiplier.6 0 In sum, despite the response letter, the increased
risk of cancer remains a source of apprehension.
Other reservations stem from uncertainty surrounding the TSA's
ability to ensure safety generally. The TSA has failed to monitor X-ray
devices in the past. For example, in 2008, the Center for Disease Control
found that in some instances the TSA failed to detect when baggage X-ray
machines emitted radiation above levels allowed by regulation standards.61
55. Id.
56. Charlea T. Massion & Adriane Fugh-Berman, Traveling by Air? Go with the Grope:
Prescription for Change, WOMEN'S HEALTH ACTIVIST, Jan. 1, 2011, at 11.
57. Id.
58. Press Release, Representative Rush Holt, Holt Continues to Question Science,
Effectiveness of TSA Full Body Scanners (Nov. 22, 2010), available at http://
holt.house.gov/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=65 1 &Itemid=18.
59. Gerald Helguero, TSA Officials Defend Pat-Downs, INT'L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2010,
4:09 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/85394/20101124/officials-try-to-explain-reasons-for-
pat-downs.htm (citing the reservations of Columbia Professor David Brenner). Professor Brenner
is also Director of the Center for Radiological Research.
60. Id.
61. Alison Young & Blake Morrison, TSA to Retest Airport Body Scanners for Radiation,
USA TODAY (Mar. 14, 2011, 5:44 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
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At other times, the agency failed to take action when machines had missing
or disabled safety features.62 More recently, in March 2011, backscatter
maintenance records showed radiation levels ten times higher than expected
for some machines. 63 The TSA defended that the tests performed by its
contractors reflected math errors and would be rerun.64 In a statement on
the topic, Senator Susan Collins said that "[m]ore than one in four
reports-randomly selected from thousands of reports over two years and
,,65covering 15 airports-included gross errors about radiation emissions.
The reporting flaws left some Congress members unsure about the
agency's ability to monitor the machines.6 6
The TSA's absence of independent oversight and the lack of
conclusive, unbiased research establishing the backscatter's safety create a
third concern. The TSA currently has exclusive responsibility in ensuring
backscatters comply with radiation emission limits.67  More troubling still,
the TSA entrusts Rapiscan, a major manufacturer of the backscatter, 6 8 and
other security screening system suppliers to perform some of its 'safety
testing.69 The TSA's reliance on private, for-profit companies in evaluating
travel/flights/2011-03-1 1-tsascansN.htm?csp=34news&utm source=feedburner&utm medium=
feed&utm campaign=Feed%3A+usatoday-NewsTopStories+(News+-+Top+Stories) [hereinafter
TSA to Retest Body Scanners].
62. Id
63. Id For more details on the errors, see Calvin Biesecker, TSA Finds Fault With
Contractor Testing of Radiation Emitted By Screening Equipment, 249 DEFENSE DAILY 48
(2011) (reporting additional inaccuracies included "leaving out readings of background radiation,
a 'lack of notation for the latest calibration date for the machine being tested,' missing
information on warning labels, 'calculation errors not impacting safety' and leaving out other
information").
64. TSA to Retest Body Scanners, supra note 61.
65. Biesecker, supra note 63.
66. See Alison Young & Blake Morrison, TSA Reports Raise Scanner Concerns;
Lawmakers Question Safety of the Devices, USA TODAY, Mar. 14, 2011, at 3A (explaining
"[a]lthough the TSA says the machines are safe .... [s]ome members of Congress aren't as
certain).
67. See TSA to Retest Body Scanners, supra note 61 (noting "[t]he TSA is responsible for
the safety of its own X-ray devices" and explaining that the FDA "does not routinely inspect the
machines because they are not considered medical devices. The TSA's airport scanners are
exempt from state radiation inspections since they belong to a federal agency").
68. Hugo Martin, Maker of Full-Body Scanner for Airports Defends the Technology, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2010, at BI (indicating Rapiscan manufactured 211 of the 385 image scanners in
use in airports at time of publication).
69. See TSA to Retest Body Scanners, supra note 61 (indicating Rapiscan engineers have
tested backscatter radiation levels); Mike M. Ahlers, TSA Orders "Re-tests" of Radiation Levels
on Airport Body Scanners, CNN (Mar. 11, 2011) http://articles.cnn.com/
2011-03-l1 /us/tsa.body.scanners_1_body-scanners-tsa-radiation-levels?_s=PM:US (stating body
scanner radiation "tests are conducted by manufacturers and contractors"); Biesecker, supra note
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machine safety has led news and online sources to voice discomfort about
its distinct lack of independent oversight.70 Worries about the paucity of
unbiased research were voiced by Senator Patrick Leahy in a Senate
committee hearing where he pressed for an "independent assessment of any
associated health effects" related to the backscatter.7' Significantly, when
the FDA conducted its assessment, it used a group of experts that included
the manufacturers of AIT machines.72 Arguably, Leahy's appeal implies
that lack of harm to date and opinions of interested parties fail to
adequately assure the safety of new, routine search technology. It could
also imply that in the context of such search tools, the government has a
responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate, via impartial investigation, the
device's continuous and long-term safety.
Lastly, sources in medicine and academia have indicated distrust in
the backscatter's functionality. Health professionals worry about over-
radiation caused by miscalibrated scanners, while one professor warns
that broken machines put passengers at risk of receiving excessive doses of
radiation, possibly even a radiation bum.74 The above observations about
backscatter safety, oversight and testing, together with concerns about
over-radiation from the academic and health community, undermine the
FDA's assurance of its safety in its response letter.
Meanwhile, millimeter wave scanners, the second type of AIT device,
have not raised the same degree of uneasiness as the backscatter, at least
not to date.75 Similar to the backscatter, the FDA's website on radiation-
emitting search devices assures that the millimeter wave technology is safe.
The site provides that "millimeter wave security systems which comply
63 (explaining the TSA employs contractors to report radiation levels, including "firms [that]
supply various systems [to] screen people").
70. See supra notes 61-63.
71. Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman,
S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (emphasis added).
72. See supra text accompanying note 51 (remarking that the FDA's group of experts
included manufacturers).
73. TSA Airport Scanner Tests Show More Radiation than Expected, MCBROOKLYN (Mar.
12, 2011, 6:20 PM), http://mcbrooklyn.blogspot.com/2011/03/tsa-airport-scanner-tests-show-
more.html.
74. Young & Morrison, supra note 61 (stating Peter Rez, a physics professor at Arizona
State University, fears "the potential for a passenger to get an excessive dose of radiation or even
a radiation burn if the X-ray scanning beam were to malfunction and stop on one part of a
person's body for an extended period of time").
75. See, e.g., Steve Strunsky, TSA Official Softens on Controversial Airport Screening
Procedures, THE STAR-LEDGER (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.nj.com/news/
index.ssf/2010/1 /tsa official appears to soften.html (stating Newark Airport's use of
millimeter wave scanners have not raised the same concerns as backscatters).
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with the limits set in the applicable national non-ionizing radiation safety
standard. . . cause no known adverse health effect." 76
Despite the FDA's assurances, new scientific findings cast doubt on
the certainty of the millimeter wave's long-term impact on health.
Specifically, a recent study by the National Institute of Health showed that
the electromagnetic radiation emitted by cell phones during a fifty-minute
phone call causes a "noticeable increase in brain activity."n While
scientists need to conduct more research before they can conclude whether
electromagnetic waves cause cancer, the study proves that the brain is
sensitive to such a degree of electromagnetic radiation.7 8 Future studies
will need to explore the long-term health effects of prolonged stimulation.79
Since millimeter wave searches expose passengers to electromagnetic
radiation, one could argue the scanners' negative effect on the brain is
similarly uncertain.
In sum, while the FDA's response letter addressed some of the health
concerns surrounding the use of AIT, many questions remain, and
undergoing a search by either device poses uncertain long-term
consequences for passenger health.
B. Advanced Imaging Technology Implicates the Fourth Amendment
Beyond its interests in national security and questions surrounding
public health, body scanning also raises constitutional concerns. The
Fourth Amendment provides "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures."80 The Supreme Court has also imposed "a presumptive warrant
requirement for searches and seizures and generally requires probable
cause for a warrantless search or seizure to be 'reasonable.'" 8 A "search"
triggering constitutional concern occurs when the government invades a
76. Radiation-Emitting Products: Products for Security Screening ofPeople, supra note 54.
77. Erin Allday, Cell Phones Affect Brain Activity, Study Says, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 23, 2011),
at A-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/02/23/
MNCOlHS9QJ.DTL; see also, Melissa Healy, Phones Trigger Brain Activity in Study: The
Findings Suggest Wireless Units May Be Altering the Way We Think and Behave, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2011, at A10 (stating that the cumulative toll of cell phone use is similarly unknown).
78. Allday, supra note 77.
79. Id.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
81. Thirty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, supra note 1, at 3; see also 2
wAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1(e)
(4th ed. 2004) (stating "the Supreme Court has long expressed a strong preference for searches
made pursuant to a search warrant").
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person's privacy. 82  To determine whether a person's expectation of
privacy is legitimate, the Court has employed a two-part test: First, the
individual must have a subjective expectation of privacy, and second,
society must be prepared to recognize that expectation as legitimate.
Courts have also considered the degree of intrusion when evaluating
whether a government action constitutes a search; minimal intrusions, for
example, have not qualified as searches.84
The TSA's use of AIT in airports implicates the Fourth Amendment
because it constitutes a search. First, body scanners are used to reveal
information about a person's body that would otherwise not be exposed to
the public. An individual has a subjective expectation of privacy regarding
their appearance underneath clothing.85 Second, this expectation is one that
society is prepared to recognize as legitimate. A number of the cases
where the Supreme Court declined to find a legitimate societal expectation
involved investigations where officials collected information that was
86otherwise publically accessible. Here, however, the information sought is
far from available to the public. Accordingly, body scans constitute a
search, and trigger the presumptive warrant requirement.
While searches generally require probable cause or a warrant, courts
have articulated several exceptions to the warrant requirement. Two
departures from the warrant requirement that AIT searches might implicate
include the special needs doctrine, and select cases of medical intrusion.
II. Jurisprudence on the Special Needs Doctrine
The "special needs" doctrine is one exception to the warrant
requirement. Roughly, it allows the government to engage in warrantless
searches in exceptional circumstances of governmental importance other
82. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 175 (1984).
83. Thirty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, supra note 1, at 5-6; see also Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating "[m]y understanding
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable').
84. Thirty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, supra note 1, at 8-9.
85. See Stoller, supra note 37 (stating that both the backscatter and the millimeter wave have
been described as types of machines "that can see underneath clothing").
86. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-14 (1986) (holding that warrantless, aerial
observation of one's backyard was not a search because such observations were from publically
navigable airspace, and thus there was no subjective expectation of privacy); cf Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001) (holding that where the government uses a device that is not in
general use to explore details of a home which would previously have been unknowable without a
physical intrusion, such surveillance is a search).
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than a law enforcement need. Though courts have applied the doctrine in
a wide range of searches, the cases share a common balancing test, which
this Note calls "reasonableness balancing." Reasonableness balancing
weighs the degree of intrusion into individual privacy on the one hand,
against the "promotion of legitimate governmental interests served by such
intrusion" on the other hand.88 Where the latter outweighs the former,
courts have allowed a warrantless search.
Administrative searches, border searches, government employee and
student drug testing, inventory searches, and checkpoints all fall under the
special needs doctrine.89  While the concept applies to a variety of
situations, the special needs analysis is context specific:90 It requires courts
to consider the government and privacy interests advanced in the particular
setting in which the search takes place.91 Disparate government interests
and variant facts can lead to subtle differences in the standard across
various contexts.
The remainder of this section considers persuasive authority for
treating airports as special needs zones, and analyzes case law to find six
factors that favor finding a special needs exception.
A. Supreme Court Dicta and Some Circuit Courts Treat Airports as a
Special Needs Zone
Persuasive authority supports treating airports as special needs zones.
In Chandler v. Miller, the Supreme Court noted that "where the risk to
public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches
calibrated to the risk may rank as 'reasonable' and offered "searches now
routine at airports" as an example.92 In City ofIndianapolis v. Edmond, the
Court alluded to airports enjoying special needs status when it stressed that
87. JOHN WESLEY HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 38.1 (3d ed. 2011). Neither judges nor
academics uniformly define "special needs." Some sources use the phrase narrowly to refer to
only those exceptions that occur in the context of employment and drug testing, while others treat
the doctrine as an umbrella term, to refer to a class of exceptions to the warrant requirement that
employ a common balancing test. Compare Thirty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure,
supra note 1, at 20, 133-39 (treating special needs as limited to employment and drug testing),
with PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A FOURTH
AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 281-98 (2005) (treating special needs as encompassing all civil
exceptions to the warrant requirement). This Note uses the term in the latter, more general, sense.
88. HUBBART, supra note 87, at 281.
89. See HALL, supra note 87.
90. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997) (asserting that the special needs
analysis is context specific).
91. See id. (prescribing courts "examin[e] closely the competing private and public interests
advanced by the parties").
92. Id. at 323.
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its holding invalidating drug checkpoints did "not affect the validity of
border searches or searches at places like airports . .. where the need for
such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute."93 Also, at
least five circuits have allowed a lower level of suspicion for airport
searches when they were a minor intrusion and the search furthered the
government's interest in curbing air piracy.9 4
B. Selected Special Needs Jurisprudence
One need not rely on persuasive authority to determine if the special
needs doctrine applies to airport screenings, or whether such an application
would exempt the TSA's use of AIT from probable cause requirements. A
survey of Supreme Court cases flesh out six factors that courts consider in
reasonableness balancing, and illustrate when these factors support a
special needs warrant exception. Cases on administrative searches and
border stops prove most helpful.
1. Administrative Searches
Camara v. Municipal Court marks an early case where the Supreme
Court calibrated a search's Fourth Amendment procedural requirements
after balancing the government and individual's interests at stake.95 In
Camara, a lessee refused to let a Public Health Inspector enter his
apartment building to conduct a warrantless inspection for housing code
violations.96 While department officials performed such area-wide
inspections based on region and pursuant to municipal code,97 the Court
held that absent a householder's consent, inspectors must still obtain a
warrant.98 More importantly, the Court made room for a context-specific
93. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48-49 (2000).
94. See Burgess v. Lowery, 201 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir. 2000) (requiring passengers to step
through metal detectors to detect weapons, absent reasonable suspicion, is justified because the
intrusion is minimal when weighed against the danger of an armed flight passenger); United
States v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107, 109-10 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding suspicionless X-ray screening of
luggage for weapons is constitutional given the limited intrusion and substantial interest in
curbing air piracy); United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 775 (11th Cir. 1984) (reasoning
that, in light of the danger of air piracy, airport security checkpoints are zones where special
Fourth Amendment considerations apply); United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir.
2005) (screening of passengers and baggage is subject to reasonableness balancing); United
States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding suspicionless searches at
airports are permitted when they are minimally intrusive and well-tailored to the significant
government interest in preventing terrorist attacks).
95. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
96. Id. at 526.
97. Id. at 536-37. To be exact, inspectors conducted searches based on area code. Id. at
537.
98. Id. at 538.
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evaluation of probable cause for these searches: "[W]here considerations of
health and safety are involved, facts that would justify an inference of
'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly different from those that
would justify . . . criminal investigation." 99 In such situations, the test for a
warrant is based on reasonableness, and consists of balancing the need to
search against the level of invasion the search entails. 00 Camara thus
introduced a relaxed standard of probable cause-one that hinges on
reasonableness-when the objective of the search is ensuring health and
safety.
The Camara Court based its holding on a "number of persuasive
factors."' 0' In parsing through the Court's decision, this Note locates six
elements that make up reasonableness balancing, and which support
finding sufficient probable cause for a warrant in this context.'0 2 First, the
agency's objective for the search was non-criminal. 0 3  The department
made housing inspections to prevent hazards to public health and safety,
and ensure compliance with minimum standards meant to avert fires,
epidemics, or unsightly conditions that cause economic blight. 10 4 Second,
residents had a decreased expectation of privacy because such programs
had a "long history of judicial and public acceptance."' 05 Third, there was
a significant nexus between the inspection and the government interest the
search sought to protect: Building inspections prevented and deterred the
kind of code violations that would cause the sorts of health risks that the
government wished to avoid.106 Fourth, the traditional test for probable
cause was impractical because dangerous conditions had to be prevented,
and it was "doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve
acceptable results." 07 Meanwhile, inspections both remedied and deterred
safety violations. This would not have been the case if inspections required
99. Id
100. Id. at 536-37.
101. Id. at 537.
102. While the Supreme Court prefaced its holding with an explicit enumeration of only three
broad factors, in fact, a total of six more nuanced factors seem apparent in Camara. See
generally LAFAVE, supra note 81 (examining the Court's special needs decisions and analyses).
Therefore, this Note will focus on a discussion of six factors common among Supreme Court
decisions in assessing the reasonableness of special needs searches.
103. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535 (stating inspections were not "aimed at the discovery of
evidence of crime").
104. Id.
105. Id. at 537.
106. See id at 535-36 (noting "those most familiar with this field [agree] that the only
effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by municipal
codes is through routine periodic inspections of all structures").
107. Id. at 537.
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probable cause, since violations could be obscured from public view.ios
Moreover, inspections would have lost their deterrence value, since
residents would be able to fix the violation in the time it takes to procure a
warrant. Fifth, the searches were minimally intrusive. The search was not
personal in nature,1 09 and the decision to inspect was based on
administrative appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole."o Since the
inspectors' goal was building safety and not crime detection, and the
searches did not single out a particular resident, arguably the building
searches were less stigmatizing for citizens."' Sixth, the standard limited
discretion: Inspectors had to get a detached and neutral magistrate's
endorsement prior to searching without a leaseholder's consent. While the
Court did not discard the warrant requirement, it tailored the standard for
probable cause to a given context1l2 based on reasonableness.
Later, in New York v. Burger, the Court specified when government
actors may conduct warrantless administrative searches, 113 and again relied
on reasonableness balancing in their decision. 114  The Court permitted
warrantless searches on commercial premises of a "pervasively regulated"
business when a substantial government interest informed the regulatory
scheme and searches were necessary to further that scheme."' It also
required that state inspection programs specify limits on the time, place,
and scope of the warrantless searches.116 In Burger, officers asked an auto
junkyard owner for his license and vehicle ownership records. 17 The law
required that owners keep such documents and give them to police upon
request.118  When defendant replied that he had neither, the police
commenced a search pursuant to statute, which the Court upheld because
junkyards were "pervasively regulated."" 9
108. See id. (indicating many conditions are not viewable from a public vantage point).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 535.
111. See LAFAVE, supra note 81, at § 10.5(a) (stating that an "inspection pursuant to an area
or periodic housing inspection scheme is not stigmatizing because it is directed to a morally
neutral class").
112. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538 (stating that a health official does not need to show the same
kind of proof to a magistrate to obtain a warrant as one would need when searching for fruits of a
crime).
113. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
114. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
115. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03.
116. Id
117. Id. at 695.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 696.
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Notably, the exception to the warrant requirement found in Burger
falls in line with the six factors found in Camara. First, the search had a
non-criminal objective. High vehicle theft rates led to expensive insurance
premiums and auto accidents,120 and New York residents bore the brunt of
these costs. The regulation that allowed the search sought to reduce this
financial burden,121 and aimed to decrease auto theft by eliminating
channels for thieves to transfer stolen cars. 122 Second, "closely regulated"
businesses have a reduced expectation of privacy in their enterprise. 12 3 In
the case of junkyards, owners had to obtain a state license and make certain
records available to state officials; they also risked criminal penalty if they
failed to comply with state provisions.124 All three of these considerations
supported finding the defendant had a reduced expectation of privacy.
Third, there was a significant nexus between warrantless searches of auto
junkyards and their records on the one hand, and the government's interests
in economy and deterrence on the other; the junkyard searches enabled
police to recover stolen items and deter theft.12 5  Fourth, a warrant
requirement was impractical because stolen cars passed quickly through an
automobile junkyard, and such a requirement would have undermined the
deterrent effect of frequent, unannounced inspections. 126 Fifth, the search
was minimally intrusive. Owners maintained the records at issue for
inspection purposes.12 7  Also, because the state commissioned licenses
contingent on documentation of vehicle title and compliance with
inspections, owners had prior notice of the search. Sixth, statutory
restrictions on the time, place, and scope of the search restrained discretion
and functioned as a substitute for a warrant by informing owners of search
conditions.12 8
Both Camara and Burger illustrate how a special need determined by
reasonableness balancing justified an exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement: The former case allowed context-specific assessments
of probable cause; the latter permitted a warrantless search.
120. Id. at 708.
121. Id.
122. Id at 708-09.
123. Id. at 702.
124. Id. at 703-04.
125. See id. at 710 (stating the searches deter theft and assist in locating stolen items).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 694 n. I. in fact, police and owners alike refer to them as "police books." Id. at
694-95.
128. Id. at 711.
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2. Border Searches
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,12 9 the Supreme Court held that
suspicionless routine stops at border checkpoints were constitutional, and
engaged in reasonableness balancing in order to reach such a holding.130
First, the stops had a non-criminal objective, namely to interdict the flow of
illegal aliens and deter smuggling.13 ' Second, travelers had a decreased
expectation of privacy at such checkpoints due to a host of factors: the
presence of passengers in their automobiles, statutes authorized border
patrol agents to question suspected aliens and inspect vehicles for aliens,
and Congress' longstanding national policy of regulating immigration. 132
Third, there was a significant nexus between the intrusion and the
government interest the intrusion sought to protect. Officers administered
the checkpoints on highways that offered a quick and safe entry into the
United States. Accordingly, the checkpoints accomplished the dual
purposes of detecting smugglers, and potentially forcing others to take less
efficient paths, which would slow their travel and make them more
vulnerable to roving patrols.13 ' Fourth, a warrant requirement or even an
increased level of suspicion would have been impractical: The heavy flow
of traffic did not permit the particularized study of cars required to develop
suspicion.1 34 Moreover, it would have eliminated the deterrent effect on
would-be smugglers. Fifth, for many reasons the practice was minimally
intrusive: The stop did not consist of a search, but only a visual inspection;
it was brief, involving only a question or two, or the production of a
document; and the checkpoint interfered with legitimate traffic less than the
alternative, namely, a roving patrol.135  Furthermore, the checkpoint was
not subjectively intrusive; it did not create fright or concern in the
individual.' 36 Since the search did not take motorists by surprise and
checkpoints had visual signs of officer authority, the subjective intrusion
129. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976).
130. For comparative purposes, this Note uses a six-factor framework to trace the Supreme
Court's special needs balancing across various search contexts. Although the Martinez-Fuerte
Court only names two general interests-the public interest and the interest of the individual-
this Note refers to facts and analyses in the opinion that support a more detailed inventory of
factors to bear on the Court's decision. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
131. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 552, 557.
132. Id. at 551, 553, 561.
133. Id. at 556-57.
134. Id. at 558.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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was low.137 Sixth, since officers in the field did not decide the location of
the checkpoint and could only stop cars at the determined checkpoint, they
had limited discretion. 38
By contrast, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Court refused to
extend similar permissive standards to roving patrols at the border. 139 The
case identifies conditions that will fail to justify suspicionless searches
when the Court employs reasonableness balancing. In Brignoni-Ponce, the
Court addressed a warrantless stop that consisted of questioning
''usually . . . no more than a minute," and visual inspection limited to parts
of the vehicle viewable by anyone standing alongside. 14 0 Similar to fixed
border checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte, officials did not search the vehicle
or its occupants.141 Unlike the checkpoints however, officers pulled drivers
over in order to conduct the stop, and did so based on their personal
discretion, without any advance notice. 14 2
While the roving stop bore similarity to fixed border checkpoints in
terms of its objective, privacy expectations, nexus, and impracticality of a
warrant requirement, its intrusiveness and lack of limits on officer
discretion led the Brignoni-Ponce Court to impose a reasonable suspicion
requirement. 14 3 With regard to intrusiveness, roving patrols ranked higher
in subjective intrusion because they often "operate[d] at night on seldom-
traveled roads, and their approach ... [could] frighten motorists."14
Motorists' surprise, along with a lack of apparent and actual authority to
conduct such stops, further added to the subjective intrusion. Also,
permitting patrols to conduct roving stops in border areas would have left
officer discretion unchecked. The Court noted that absent a suspicion
requirement, the patrol "would subject the residents of these and other
areas to potentially unlimited interference."1 4 5 The Court considered the
137. See id at 559 (finding that "[t]he regularized manner in which established checkpoints
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly
authorized").
138. Id.
139. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
140. Id. at 880.
141. Id.
142. Id at 874-75.
143. See Id. at 885 (stating that, except at the border and its functional equivalents, officers
on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together
with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles
contain aliens who may be illegally in the country) (emphasis added).
144. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976) (discussing Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873).
145. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882.
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subjective intrusion and lack of discretion to necessitate a higher quantum
of suspicion than fixed border checkpoints. On these grounds, it required
roving patrols to have reasonable suspicion before making a stop. The
impermissible suspicionless border search in Brignoni-Ponce, when
contrasted with Martinez-Fuerte, provides insight to search conditions
required to pass reasonableness balancing.
III. Jurisprudence on Medical Intrusion
In addition to special needs searches, body scanning may also trigger
Fourth Amendment issues related to medically intrusive searches. Part III
of this Note lays out the Supreme Court's standard for assessing the
constitutionality of such searches, referred to here as the "Schmerber
factors," and examines how lower courts have used the factors to
demarcate the threshold of reasonable, warrantless searches that implicate
health concerns.
A. Supreme Court Cases on Medical Intrusion
The Supreme Court has addressed searches that implicate medical
concerns on only a few occasions. In Schmerber v. California, the Court
first espoused the three-factor test to determine the constitutionality of the
search. 14 6 In Schmerber, a driver was hospitalized after a car accident. 147
Upon smelling alcohol, an officer arrested the driver and ordered a
physician to take a blood sample despite the driver's refusal.14 8 The Court
found the compelled, warrantless blood withdrawal in this case
permissible. 14 9 Officers did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights because, first, the evidence was evanescent and second, the test was
minimally intrusive, low risk, and tailored to the purpose.15 0 In arriving at
its holding, the Court cautioned that such bodily intrusions cannot be based
on mere chance; police should have a clear indication that evidence will be
found.15 1 In this case, the probable cause for the arrest established probable
cause for the search: It provided a clear indication that the search would
render evidence of intoxication. 15 2 Moreover, the body's rapid elimination
of alcohol and the time it took to transport defendant to the hospital made
146. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966).
147. Id. at 758.
148. Id. at 758, 761.
149. Id at 772.
150. Id at 770-71.
151. Id. at 769-70.
152. Id. at 770-71.
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the attempt to secure evidence of defendant's blood alcohol level
appropriate. 153
The Schmerber Court found the method of extraction reasonable,
because it was effective in determining intoxication and posed little trauma,
pain, or risk to defendant's health.154 Here, the defendant did not have
reason for "fear [or] concern for health" because the test did not invite an
unjustified risk of infection.' 55  The manner in which the test was
performed was reasonable because a physician administered the test in a
hospital. 156  Courts have subsequently interpreted the case to require a
court, when assessing a warrantless search that implicates health concerns,
to weigh three factors: the risk to the individual, the intrusion on bodily
integrity, and the community interest in accurately assessing guilt.
In Winston v. Lee, the Schmerber factors led the Supreme Court to
declare certain kinds of medical searches impermissible.15 7 In Winston, the
state sought to compel the surgical removal of a bullet from a suspect's
chest when the procedure required the suspect to undergo general
anesthesia. 58 The police suspected the defendant of robbing a store, where
the shop owner shot back and wounded the robber.159 Police found the
defendant wounded a few blocks away, and the shopkeeper identified
him. 60  The Court decided the search was unreasonable and therefore
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.161
In finding the search unconstitutional, the Court applied the
Schmerber balancing test: weighing the risk to the individual's safety and
the intrusion upon bodily integrity against the community interest in
accurately assessing guilt.162 Regarding the risks, the Court stated that,
despite probable cause, "a search for evidence of a crime may be
unjustifiable if it endangers the life or health of the suspect."l63 The Court
distinguished the search in Schmerber, where "all reasonable medical
precautions were taken and no unusual or untested procedures were
153. Id. at 770.
154. Id. at 772.
155. Id. at 771-72.
156. Id at 770-71.
157. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
158. Id. at 755.
159. Id. at 755-56.
160. Id. at 765.
161. Id. at 766.
162. Id. at 761-63.
163. Id at 761.
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employed"'6 from the surgery in Winston, which required probing
incisions and put the defendant at risk of infection.'6 5 With respect to the
intrusion on bodily integrity, the Court differentiated the procedure in
Schmerber-a "commonplace" blood test-from the practice in Winston,
which required administering general anesthesia to the defendant that
would force him into an unconscious state.16 6  The Court found the
intrusion of the latter significant because the surgery involved "a virtual[]
total divestment of respondent's ordinary control over surgical probing
beneath his skin."1 6 7  Finally, the community had a lesser interest in
extracting the bullet in Winston, when compared to the search in
Schmerber; in Winston, the state did not need the bullet to prove its case in
light of the shopkeeper's identification and the wounded defendant's
proximity to the crime shortly after its occurrence.168  Thus, Winston
reveals important limitations on constitutional, medically intrusive
searches.
B. Lower Court Decisions Regarding Medical Intrusion
The Supreme Court has provided a three-factor test to determine
whether a search that potentially implicates health risks violates the Fourth
Amendment. While Schmerber and Winston offer important bookends for
medically intrusive search jurisprudence, lower court decisions help to
demarcate the threshold of reasonable, warrantless searches that implicate
health concerns. Specifically, such decisions flesh out circumstances
where a warrant or court order is required and when a search can be
conducted absent additional procedural safeguards.
1. Searches that Require a Warrant or Court Order
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and the Seventh Circuit require greater Fourth Amendment
procedural protections for searches involving non-consensual X-rays or
general anesthesia of unknown risks, respectively.
In United States v. Allen, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that affidavits in support of a motion
to compel defendant to submit to an X-ray did not establish probable cause,
and therefore denied the motion.169 The court conceived of X-rays as no
164. Id.
165. Id at 764-65.
166. Id. at 762, 765.
167. Id. at 765.
168. Id. at 765-66.
169. United States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041, 1043-44 (E.D. Pa 1972).
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less intrusive than blood withdrawals and noted that, absent a warrant or
special circumstances excusing a warrant, the search could not be
authorized." Thus, non-consensual X-rays required at least probable
cause.
In United States v. Husband, the Seventh Circuit evaluated the
reasonableness of a search of defendant's body while he was under general
anesthesia.'7 1 In that case, police suspected that the defendant, Eunice
Husband, had swallowed drugs at the time of his arrest. 17 2 Later, when the
defendant appeared to be having a seizure, police transported him to the
hospital and obtained a warrant to search "the body of Eunice Husband" for
"illegal drugs, weapons, or contraband." 73  The doctor administered
general anesthesia to treat the overdose and to facilitate the search.174 The
court discerned that evidence of the risk to Husband's health was unclear,
the procedure seriously invaded the defendant's privacy and liberty
interests, and the community had a strong interest in the search because the
government could not likely prosecute without such evidence. 7 5  On
balance, the deficit of facts explaining why the police did not provide the
defendant "greater procedural protections, including application for a
warrant ... specifically authorizing them to administer a general
anesthetic," led the court to grant a motion to suppress the evidence. 7 6
Husband supports the need for a specific warrant to administer general
anesthesia when the procedure poses unknown health risks, at least in some
situations.
Together, Allen and Husband support imposing additional procedural
safeguards for searches using nonconsensual X-rays or general anesthesia
with unknown risks.
170. Id. at 1043.
171. United States v. Husband, 226 F.3d 626, 628-629 (7th Cir. 2000).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 628.
174. Id. at 629.
175. See Id at 631-33 (stating that the record was unclear as to the danger or safety of the
general anesthesia, that defendant was not allowed to refuse treatment or determine his course of
care, and was subject to compelled administration of general anesthesia; the passage also analyzes
the community interest).
176. Id at 635-36; see also United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(holding a court order compelling the removal of a bullet was permissible since it was supported
by probable cause, and because the operation was minor, performed by a skilled physician, and
posed little risk).
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2. Searches that Do Not Require a Warrant or Court Order
Some state supreme courts have held that medical searches in the form
of stomach pumps and laxatives do not require a warrant. In drawing their
conclusion, these courts have also used the Schmerber factors.
In State v. Strong, police apprehended a defendant who then admitted
he swallowed crack cocaine."7 Having also witnessed the defendant
imbibe the drugs, the officers, acting without a warrant, took the defendant
to a hospital, requested that medical personnel pump his stomach, and
recovered the cocaine.178 The court employed the Schmerber test and
found the procedure did not pose a risk to defendant's health since it
"involved virtually no lasting trauma or pain, and ... was conducted in a
hospital by medical personnel according to accepted medical practices." 79
Regarding the intrusion to defendant's interests in privacy and bodily
integrity, the court concluded that a stomach pump was not an "unduly
extensive imposition" on either interest; like the blood test in Schmerber,
the stomach pump was "a common and accepted method of testing which
normally does not cause any lasting ill effects."', 80 Finally, in weighing the
community interest in fair and accurate determinations of guilt, the court
again found the stomach pump comparable to the Schmerber blood test
because it was highly effective in determining the presence of the drug and,
given the officers' observations and defendant's admission, the facts
clearly indicated the search would produce the evidence.18 On balance, the
Iowa Supreme Court held that warrantless stomach pumping was a
permissible search under Schmerber.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion regarding
the administration of laxatives. In State v. Payano-Roman, police watched
defendant under surveillance after an informant reported defendant was
trafficking drugs.18 2 As officers identified themselves, they thought they
saw defendant ingest a baggie of heroin.'83  When police explained to
ambulance personnel what happened, they took the defendant to a hospital
where staff treated him with laxatives. 184 The court applied the Schmerber
177. State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1992).
178. Id. at 835.
179. Id. at 838.
180. Id. at 837 (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 442 (1957)).
181. Strong, 493 N.W.2d at 837-38.
182. State v. Payano-Roman, 714 N.W.2d 548, 551 (Wis. 2006).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 551-52 (indicating hospital personnel determined treatment, while one officer
assisted and translated).
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factors to determine the constitutionality of the search.185 First, contrary to
posing a risk to the defendant's health, the court noted that the laxative was
"medically indicated" for the defendant's health, and a normal hospital
practice.186 Also, officers did not dictate the treatment; rather, medical staff
decided the course of care.'" Second, the defendant's bodily integrity
would have been more compromised if personnel had not performed the
procedure; forgoing intervention would have increased the time he was
exposed to the fatal possibility that the baggie would rupture internally.'88
Third, regarding the community interest in accurately assessing guilt, the
court found the circumstances clearly indicated that the laxative would
produce evidence of the crime.' 89 It concluded as much based on the
officer's observation, the informant's accurate description of defendant, the
procedure's efficacy in producing the heroin, and the government's need to
use the procedure to obtain the evidence to make its case.' 90
In both cases, the state supreme courts cited commonality of
treatment, administration dictated by medical personnel, and the
ameliorative effect of the procedure to support their findings of low risk
and low intrusion on bodily integrity. Moreover, since police observed
defendant ingesting the drug, the courts also found a significant community
interest in retrieval. Strong and Payano-Roman support finding warrantless
administration of stomach pumps and laxatives to be reasonable searches
when police believe they have seen a person ingest narcotics.
IV. Analysis of Medical Intrusion and Special Needs Search
Jurisprudence in the Context of the
TSA's Use of Body Scanning
Both strands of jurisprudence discussed above offer a possible
framework for evaluating the constitutionality of the TSA's routine body
scanning in airports. Part IV of this Note explores the application of
medical intrusion and special needs jurisprudence to the use of AIT in
airports. It concludes that while the permissibility of such a search is
uncertain when analyzed in terms of medical intrusion, special needs
jurisprudence indicates that, under current conditions, officials should be
required to have reasonable suspicion before scanning airline passengers.
185. Id at 557.
186. Id at 558.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 559-60.
189. Id at 560.
190. Id.
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A. Application of Medical Intrusion Jurisprudence to Body Scanning
Since AITs use in airports amounts to a search that carries uncertain
health risks, the practice falls within the province of medically intrusive
search case law, and the Schmerber factors apply.
1. Risk to the Individual
It is not overwhelmingly clear that body scanning passes the first
prong of the Schmerber factors, which evaluates the risk that the search
poses to the individual. Courts assigned a low risk to procedures that were
"commonplace,"l 91 "involved virtually no lasting trauma or pain, and. . .
,,192[were] conducted ... according to accepted medical practices. Here,
there is reason to determine that AIT fails on all three counts.
First, the backscatter and millimeter wave devices do not approximate
the pedestrian nature of blood tests today. The medical procedures that
constituted permissible intrusions were firmly rooted in the medical
tradition, and had long histories of therapeutic use before they were ever
used as a search method in the course of an investigation. The same cannot
be said for the body scanner. Instead, Customs first employed the devices
in airports around the year 2000193 and the Food and Drug Administration
has only regulated full body X-ray security screening systems since
1990.194 Since the FDA has only recently begun to regulate the devices,
their deployment as a routine search procedure is one of unprecedented
haste relative to other search methods that posed possible health risks.
Second, it is uncertain whether the body scanning devices will result
in lasting trauma since longitudinal studies are lacking, and both devices
carry at least some risk of harm. In the case of the backscatter, for
example, some scientists say that although the scanner's annual radiation is
lower than the national standard, the radiation may still affect the skin
unpredictably.'95 Also, the millimeter wave scanner poses the potential of
altering brain activity.196 Since both cancer and alterations to the brain may
qualify as a lasting trauma, arguably both forms of AIT differ from the
191. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762, 765 (1984) (stating that the blood test in
Schmerber was "commonplace").
192. State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Iowa 1992).
193. Stephen Vina, Note, Virtual Strip Searches at Airports: Are Border Searches Seeing
Through the Fourth Amendment?, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 417, 418 n.4 (2002).
194. Letter from McCrohan and Waters, supra note 48.
195. Mark Whitehouse, This Week: Korean Crisis, Trading Sting, Black Friday, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 27, 2010, at A8.
196. See supra Part I.A.iv.
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permissive blood withdrawal in Schmerber.1 9 7  Such concerns increase
when one considers the potential for machine malfunction that, in turn, can
cause even greater harm through excess radiation emissions.198
Third, the lack of medical supervision of the search increases the risk
it poses to the individual. While a government agency made the decision to
conduct AIT searches on all airline passengers, by contrast, in Schmerber,
Payano-Roman, and Strong, it was hospital personnel that decided to
administer the intrusive search.199 Presumably, the latter professionals are
more adept in responding to, and avoiding, hazards to the individual's
health. Moreover, while body scanning is administered in airports,
permissive medical searches were performed in hospitals.2 00 Certainly,
such facilities are better equipped to address potential unforeseen
complications. Additionally, body scanners have fewer regulatory
safeguards than medical devices. The FDA distinguishes medical devices
from non-medical, radiation-emitting products and subjects the former to
more regulatory control.20 ' In the case of medical devices, where a
product's failure is reasonably likely to result in serious adverse health
consequences, the FDA may order post-market surveillance of the
device.202 Meanwhile the agency does not compel oversight for similar
radiation-emitting security products.20 3  Because AIT's long-term safety
remains an open question, the search's deficit of supervision-in its
197. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
198. See Alison Young, Previous Problems with X-ray Machines Missed, USA TODAY, Dec.
7, 2010, at 6A (stating that in 2003 and 2004, the Center for Disease found six luggage X-ray
machines to violate federal radiation standards, some emitting more than two to three times the
allowed limit, which TSA failed to notice).
199. See supra Parts III.A, Ill.B.ii.
200. See TSA WHOLE BODY IMAGING, supra note 22 (stating screenings take place at the
airport); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758 (stating blood was drawn after defendant was already in the
hospital); Payano-Roman, 714 N.W.2d at 552 (stating patient was administered laxative while in
private hospital room); Strong, 493 N.W.2d at 835 (stating defendant's stomach was pumped at
the hospital).
201. See Medical Devices: Overview of Device Regulation, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/default.htm (last
visited Mar. 3, 2011) (stating that medical devices are divided into three classes of increasing
regulation); Radiation-Emitting Products: Getting a Radiation Emitting Product to Market, FOOD
AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Radiation-EmittingProducts/
ElectronicProductRadiationControlProgram/GettingaProducttoMarket/default.htm (last visited
Mar. 3, 2011) (stating "[m]anufacturers may be subject to additional FDA regulations if their
product is intended to be used in a medical application").
202. 21 C.F.R. § 822.4 (2011).
203. 21 C.F.R. § 1002.3 (2011) (indicating non-medical radiation emitting devices need only
supply ultimate users with performance data).
environment, personnel, and regulatory oversight-may distinguish it from
previous permissive medical searches.
2. Intrusion on Bodily Integrity
It is possible that a court could find that body scanners rank low on the
second Schmerber factor, which evaluates the intrusion to the individual's
bodily integrity, but such a conclusion is by no means a given. The scan
does not require a total divestment of control of one's body, as general
anesthesia does, and at first blush seems physically less imposing than the
permissible stomach pump. Since travelers maintain autonomy over their
body and the search demands passengers merely stand still for a short
period of time, AIT proponents may argue the scans pose little intrusion.
Notwithstanding arguments that AIT amounts to only a mild
imposition on the body, the devices differ from previously sanctioned
medical searches. For example, in Strong, while concluding that the search
did not intrude on a defendant's bodily integrity, the court also considered
that the procedure did not result in any "lasting ill effects."204 With respect
to body scanners, however, research has yet to conclusively establish any
absence of lasting ill effects.
Additionally, in Payano-Roman, when the court held that a particular
intrusive search passed the Schmerber test, it was because the search's
ameliorative benefit offset its intrusion: The defendant would have incurred
a greater health risk if the search did not occur.2 0 5 Use of AIT to search
airport passengers does not result in a similar direct health benefit. While
AIT's supporters may object by arguing that routine body scanning benefits
passengers by ensuring safe travel on contraband-free aircraft, the analogy
is shaky. The critical difference is that the Payano-Roman search was
ameliorative, while AIT searches are preventative. In Payano-Roman,
personnel conducted an intrusive search after defendant personally faced a
hazardous situation. By contrast, the TSA conducts AIT searches to
eliminate the chance that passengers will face a hazardous situation in the
near future. Payano's search remedied an immediate threat; AIT deters a
speculative one.206
204. Strong, 493 N.W.2d at 837 (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 442 (1957)).
205. Payano-Roman, 714 N.W.2d at 559-60 (where forgoing a stomach pump would have
subjected the defendant to the danger of drug balloons rupturing).
206. To use a different comparison, TSA screens all passengers for dangerous objects. They
employ the search measure to prevent hijackings because some previous passengers smuggled
dangerous items on board. If the same reasoning applied in the Payano-Roman context, then
personnel could pump the stomach of everyone with access to heroine while under police watch
to prevent suspects from ingesting it because some suspects had ingested heroine while under
police watch in the past.
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3. Community Interest
The prong that weighs most heavily in favor of concluding that AIT is
a permissive medical search is the third, which considers the community
interest in accurate assessment of guilt. The TSA conducts searches with
AIT for the purpose of expediently discerning airline security threats
among volumes of people. An accurate assessment of guilt in this context
likely prevents airplane hijacking and the losses that accompany it, as well
as aids in the prosecution of attempted hijackers. As medical intrusion
cases indicate, the community interest will be met if the searches detect
security risks, and it would be difficult for the agency to otherwise
accomplish its purpose.207 AIT's strength lies in its ability to detect risks
such as metallic and non-metallic explosives concealed on the body.
Critics of the technology may challenge its ability to serve the
community interest on three grounds. First, opponents of AIT may
question its efficacy in threat detection. It could be argued that intelligence
and behavioral profiling is a better means to identify threats, since none of
the hijackers in 9/11 used prohibited items. One could also point out that
the device may not be foolproof since some scientists have already been
able to prevent a simulated version of AIT from detecting objects.2 08
Second, AIT does not protect against security hazards immediately outside
secured boarding areas, yet much destruction can result from bombs in
these areas. Third, it is not clear that it would be difficult for the
government to accomplish its safety goals without resorting to the kinds of
searches with indeterminate health effects. The European Commission, for
example, has proposed alternative screening methods for expectant
mothers, infants, and the disabled; 20 9 the proposal supports the inference
that, at least for some European legislators, airport safety is not entirely
dependent on backscatter screenings. Another option that does not pose
health risks would be for scientists to ensure the millimeter wave scanner's
radio waves differ from the potentially harmful radio waves found in cell
phones. Since the availability of alternative search methods cuts against a
finding of high community interest, the advent of security measures which
do not rely on AIT weaken the community interest in the use of body
scanners.
207. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1984);Payano-Roman, 714 N.W.2d at 560.
208. See Flam, supra note 25 (stating that, while "[i]ndependent scientists can't get access to
the scanners for tests... University of California physicists Leon Kauftann and Joe Carlson
used computer simulations [of AIT]. They focused on the X-ray scanners and discovered it was
possible to fool them . .. [It is possible to] make an object with diffuse edges [so that it is] harder
to see.").
209. See, e.g., Stoller, supra note 37.
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These challenges are answerable, however. While 9/11 signaled a
significant shift in aviation security, threats to airport security are not
confined to the methods used in that single event. Abdulmutallab's attempt
to detonate plastic explosives, for example, underscores the progressive
nature of the methods hijackers use to disguise their plans. AIT meets the
need to consistently detect security threats despite changes in form.
Additionally, the argument may be made that breaches to airplane security
are not on par with attacks outside secure boarding areas such that using
AIT still meets the community interest. The justification for the distinction
would hinge on accepting that such breaches now carry heavier symbolic
meaning for the American people, as a result of the 9/11 attacks. Finally, a
security measure need not be error-proof to be effective in meeting its goal.
In light of only weak objections to AIT's satisfaction of the third
Schmerber prong, a court would likely find the community interest in
allowing AIT searches to be strong.
In sum, application of the Schmerber factors indicates that the TSA's
use of AIT serves a significant community interest, but may carry sizable
risks, and has an indeterminate degree of bodily intrusion. The Schmerber
court held a warrantless search permissible when community interest was
high, and both risk and intrusion on bodily integrity were low. Meanwhile,
the Husband court required a warrant when, despite strong community
interest, the search was low in risk and high in bodily intrusion.
Comparison of the cases supports the proposition that a search will require
a warrant in the face of a strong community interest when at least one other
Schmerber factor is significantly high. While AIT serves a strong
community interest, it is not clear that the risk or the intrusion is high
enough to push AIT past the tipping point, whereby a warrant would be
required. For a more definitive answer on the constitutionality of routine
AIT searches, this Note turns to the special needs doctrine.
B. Application of Special Needs Jurisprudence to Body Scanning
Even if AIT supporters cannot justify its use pursuant to a Schmerber
analysis, proponents might still rescue the constitutionality of AIT searches
under the special needs doctrine, which allows deviations from probable
cause and warrant requirements when a search survives the six-factor
reasonableness balancing test. Relevant cases have found the doctrine
available for inspections when: 1) the objective was non-criminal; 2)
individuals had a decreased privacy expectation; 3) the search bore a
sufficient nexus to the government interest; 4) requiring a higher level of
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suspicion was impractical; 5) the search was minimally intrusive; and 6)
agent discretion was limited.210
1. Six-Factor Reasonableness Balancing in the Context ofBody Scans
a. Non-criminal Objective
In terms of its objective, the government's goal in employing AIT at
airports serves the non-criminal purpose of detecting and deterring terrorist
threats in the interest of public safety. Arguably, this interest is most
reminiscent of that in administrative searches of closely regulated
industries, where part of the government's goal was to protect the
customers and employees of such businesses. However, AIT's objective is
relatively weightier than that of housing inspections or border searches;
while the government justified previous searches on the basis of avoiding
economic blight and interdicting illegal immigration, AIT searches are
meant to prevent potentially lethal activity. It follows that body scans
serve a non-criminal purpose.
b. Decreased Expectation of Privacy
Travelers do not have a reduced expectation of privacy when it comes
to body scanning. While at first glance it may be tempting to conclude that
privacy expectations are lower due to federal regulation of the industry,
closer inspection indicates that government supervision over airline
passengers is more tenuous than its oversight of the typical regulated
business owner. The latter must file for license and registration, and is
thereby on notice that its ability to participate in the industry is contingent
on its compliance with regulation. Meanwhile, the airline passenger's
actions only come under regulation when he opts to fly. The lesser degree
and frequency of government oversight in the case of the passenger
distinguishes him from the closely regulated business owner. Also,
passengers' advance notice of the search does not decrease the expectation
of privacy as it did in the case of border checkpoints. Unlike the conditions
in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, advance notice of screening does not
enable passengers to limit the information they reveal in the search. In
Martinez-Fuerte, notice of the brief visual inspection of a car at a fixed
checkpoint meant that the driver could limit what the officer sees by not
carrying an item or hiding it from view. By contrast, airline passengers
cannot take precautions to prevent TSA officials from viewing the contours
of their body once inside the AIT booth. The search site is also unique;
unlike searching a business during regular hours or a vehicle on a public
210. See supra Part II.B.
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highway, AIT searches an individual's body. Finally, AIT's use in airports
does not have a longstanding history of judicial acceptance like border
searches and housing inspections. As a result, the TSA does not administer
body scans in the context of a decreased expectation of privacy.
c. Sufficient Nexus to the Government Interest
Body scans do, however, have a significant nexus between the search
and the government interest that they seek to protect. Screening passengers
with AIT is meant to detect and deter threats to air traffic safety. The most
recent threats include passengers who attempt to board flights with non-
metallic explosives concealed on the body. Because AIT enables the TSA
to detect such dangerous materials, which would not set off a metal
detector or luggage scanners, the search carries the requisite nexus to the
government interest it seeks to protect.
d. Impracticality of a Higher Level of Suspicion
A warrant requirement for body scans would be impractical due to
difficulties it shares with fixed border checkpoints. The volume of
passengers that the TSA must assess for security threats, along with added
time pressures due to a patron's need to make scheduled flights, mean that
officials have only fleeting opportunities for observation. Thus, such a
high quantum of suspicion would likely never be met. Also, similar to
Martinez-Fuerte, a warrant requirement would frustrate the goal of
deterrence.
e. Minimal Intrusiveness
The search's level of intrusion fails to be minimal because the scan
ranks high in subjective intrusiveness. Since AIT poses uncertain long-
term health risks, the subjective experience of a body scan is similar to a
roving patrol. Significantly, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Court
found roving patrols subjectively intrusive not because the stops were
actually intrusive, but because travelers did not have affirmative prior
knowledge of their legitimacy.211  In fact, the Court called the actual
intrusion "modest," and the stop consisted of the same brief questions and
visual inspection as warrantless fixed border searches.2 12 Nonetheless, it
found the search impermissibly invasive because passengers had no way to
determine the safety of the stop beforehand. Regarding AIT, travelers also
lack conclusive and independent assurance that the scans will not adversely
impact their health. Furthermore, similar to roving patrols, the lack of
211. See supra Part II.B.ii.
212. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975).
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advance assurances of safety may lead passengers to find the scans
frightening or annoying. Therefore, since both AIT and roving patrol
searches potentially evoke fear or concern in citizens, it follows that body
scanners rank similarly in level of intrusiveness.
f. Limited Agent Discretion
Finally, TSA officials have limited discretion in the airport context.
Similar to fixed border checkpoints, screening takes place at a fixed
location. TSA agents cannot choose whom to screen because the protocol
calls for the screening of all passengers, and the scope of the search is
limited to passengers entering secure boarding areas.
2. Reasonable Suspicion Required to Conduct Searches with AIT
Unlike permissive warrantless searches at fixed checkpoints and in
closely regulated industries, primary screening at airports using AIT does
not "pass" all six factors. The search is not minimally intrusive, and is not
conducted pursuant to a decreased expectation of privacy. In Brignoni-
Ponce, the Court imposed a reasonable suspicion requirement on roving
patrol stops because such stops lacked the elements of minimal intrusion
and limited discretion. 2 13 Similarly, airport body scans fall short on two
elements, including the common element of minimal intrusion. One may
reasonably argue that TSA officials should conduct the searches pursuant
to the same standard as Brignoni-Ponce, since AIT searches are similarly
deficient. For this reason, the current practice of suspicionless body
scanning at airports is counter to precedent.
To cohere with precedent, the government has two options. It could
limit the use of AIT to passengers whose behavior creates a reasonable
suspicion. Alternatively, the government could eliminate the reasonable
suspicion prerequisite by remedying the two special needs factors where
screening is deficient. Most promising, the TSA could decrease the
subjective intrusion, and thereby make the scans minimally intrusive, if
independent research ruled out the technology's risk to health. Reducing
passenger expectation of privacy proves more difficult, but a tentative
solution could explore detecting threats via heat or color alone, so that TSA
officials may not view the contours of a person's body.
Requiring the TSA to have reasonable suspicion to search using AIT,
or insisting the agency remedy its special needs shortcomings before using
AIT routinely, raises a practical difficulty. It frustrates deployment of
quick and comprehensive threat detection and, perhaps, national security.
213. See supra Part II.B.ii.
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Nonetheless, adamantly requiring the government to meet its special needs
burden respects precedent and logic. The Court has consistently evaluated
special needs searches according to six factors.214 Relative to other search
exceptions, the doctrine reflects that "the Fourth Amendment imposes only
the weakest of restrictions on government intrusions outside of traditional
criminal law enforcement."215 It stands to reason that, in light of so few
constraints and consistent judicial evaluation of all six factors, each
constraint has considerable import, and should be satisfied for the
exception to apply.
Moreover, obligating the government to meet its special needs burden
despite the drawback makes sense policy-wise. Since the special needs
doctrine applies to searches outside the criminal arena, it governs those
searches that the general public will encounter most. Demanding
adherence to the standards of the doctrine will help preserve safeguards for
non-criminal searches.
Finally, requiring the government to forgo routine AIT use until
search conditions meet all six special needs factors-or at least limit body
scans to reasonably suspicious travelers-coheres with common sense. It
is doubtless that before the government performs a suspicionless search on
a large segment of the population, it should make available unbiased
assessments of the search's safety. In the case of special needs, this
consideration has even more force since the search population includes
children and elderly. While adherence to the doctrine creates a practical
drawback for AIT, a single drawback is not equivalent to a fatal drawback.
A survey of the bigger picture-namely precedent, logic, policy, and
common sense-provides reason for strict compliance with the doctrine
despite the practical shortcoming.
Conclusion
Considering the volume of people and time pressures at airports, and
in light of attacks on airline security, the government has a pressing need
for an expedient, non-discretionary means of detecting security threats.
The TSA's use of body scanning for primary screening, however, triggers
health concerns because independent research has yet to establish the long-
term safety of body scanning devices. Two strands of jurisprudence
potentially inform the constitutionality of the agency's deployment of AIT:
the special needs doctrine and case law addressing searches that implicate
214. See supra Parts II.B.i-ii.
215. Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away:
The Century of Fourth Amendment "Search and Seizure" Doctrine, 100 J CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 933, 1035 (2010).
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health concerns. The latter essentially hinges on an assessment of the
Schmerber factors, which weigh the search's risk and intrusion on bodily
integrity against the community's interest in conducting the search. While
a Schmerber analysis does not yield conclusive support for or opposition to
AIT, special needs jurisprudence provides an argument against the TSA's
suspicionless body scans, and a basis for requiring reasonable suspicion.
Namely, because travelers do not have a reduced privacy expectation when
they submit to AIT, and under Brignoni-Ponce the search is likely intrusive
due to its uncertain health risks, precedent dictates that body scans do not
qualify for the special needs exception. Because the TSA conducts such
scans routinely-that is, without reasonable suspicion-its current
screening practice contravenes the Fourth Amendment. Routine body
scanning's constitutional deficiencies are repairable, but not without
inconvenience; correcting 'the special needs shortcomings of AIT will
likely delay the technology's availability as a passenger screening tool.
While strict adherence to the special needs doctrine creates a pragmatic
drawback, the interests of precedent, logic, policy and common sense
nonetheless compel steadfast compliance with the standard of balancing
public and private interests when departing from Fourth Amendment
procedural protections.
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